The Making of the Great Depression
One of the most studied periods of
American history, the Great Depression remains fundamental to the American experience.
During the Depression, Americans confronted harsh economic realities. Few
experienced little to no hardship. To put this idea into perspective,
unemployment spiked from less than 4 percent in 1929, to 25 percent by 1933.[1] Over the same period, GNP fell
46 percent.[2]
While
some consensus does exist on the Depression’s effects, the same cannot be said
concerning its cause. Most theories are influenced by one of two schools of
thought: consumption or monetary. Standard interpretations, by and large, are
shaped by concerns of consumption. Episodes of irrational stock-market
speculation, capitalism’s inherent instability, and Herbert Hoover’s
laissez-faire policymaking, we are told, caused the Depression.[3] And FDR’s interventionist New
Deal and public works programs drove America’s long-awaited return to
prominence and equilibrium by the end of the 1930s.
Established
by British economist John Keynes, consumption theory emphasized aggregate demand
and questioned the market’s ability to quickly self-correct. To confront
disequilibrium, the economy required government intervention through increased spending
to restore employment and revitalize aggregate demand. In sharp contrast, free
market and monetary thinkers such as American economist Milton Friedman argue failed
government intervention and ill-advised monetary policies triggered and
prolonged the depression. For Friedman, banking panics from decreased money
supplies destroyed economic activity. Had big government resisted their emerging
interventionist impulses, one can argue market cycles and circumspect government
intervention alone would have prevented the Depression. In the end, this essay largely
agrees with Friedman. Now let us turn our attention to American life in the
1920s.
Due
to the postwar boom, the American economy flourished until approximately 1925. Deemed
the Roaring Twenties, this period represented a uniquely prosperous time in
America. Americans possessed overwhelmingly more access to goods and services
than ever before. Mass transportation continued to expand. Railroads headed in seemingly
all directions. Urban sprawls developed at breakneck speeds. And the automotive
industry was evolving as well from fierce competition and advancing technology.
In fact, the industrious Henry Ford mastered efficiency so well that by 1925,
he sold Model T’s for $300, a $600 reduction from its inception in 1908.
However,
by the mid-1920s, the once flourishing American economy stalled. In many
respects, the prosperity of the Roaring Twenties was generated by problematic
monetary and fiscal policy making. Put simply, the Feds cheap money triggered speculation
and the bubble eventually burst. As such, the stock market crashed in 1929,
then the Depression developed. Given that the money supply increased by
one-third from the early 1920s to 1929, a crash was seemingly inevitable with
such sustained levels of irrational stock market speculation.
In
response, the Feds, rather than increasing the money supply, did the exact
opposite until 1933. Milton Friedman, as such, blamed the Federal Reserve. When
the Feds failed to assist the Bank of the United States, a banking crisis
resulted.[4] As public hysteria
intensified, massive bank runs followed. Here we see some agreement between
Friedman and Keynesian’s “animal spirits.”[5] By 1930, a stunning 352
banks closed.[6]
Friedman claimed Depression could have been prevented had pre-1914 methods of
payment restrictions been applied, like what transpired during the Panic of 1907.[7] Soon after restriction in
1907, the economy started recovering. However, in the case of the Depression, the
Reserve System responded to bank failures in 1931, 1932, and 1933 by again tightening
the money supply. Participating in “large-scale open market purchases of
government bonds,” as Friedman put it, would have “provided banks with
additional cash to meet the demands of its depositors.”[8] A missed opportunity to repair
a rapidly deteriorating economy, to be sure.
Plagued
by failing banks, and falling income and employment, Americans survived the Depression
by drawing from their unique sense of grit, compassion, and ingenuity. Countless
Americans focused on saving cash and decreasing consumption. At the same time,
acts of humanitarianism and philanthropy swept through the country. Still, economic
recovery remained elusive, as unemployment stayed in double digits until World
War II.[9] To be sure, FDR’s New Deal
and his public works programs put Americans back to work, but at what cost?
Today,
much of the discourse surrounding the Depression concentrate on cause, effect,
and how and why the Depression ended. While such conversations advance knowledge,
one aspect often understudied concerns the relationship between crisis and government
expansion. For Robert Higgs, bureaucracy never expanded gradually, nor was it
an inevitable outgrowth of capitalism and/or urban-industrial economic
dominance. Rather, government expansion during the 20th century surged
during crisis and was shaped by ideology. And once order and equilibrium were restored,
most, if not all newly established government formations and authority remained
intact.[10] Given that government expansion
remains constant even today, what might we make of this? And how might this
influence how the Depression era and the New Deal is interpreted? And where does
scale fit into this conversation considering America is a constitutional
republic? Ultimately, Friedman and Higgins research center a myriad of concerns
regarding the implications and often deleterious effects of big government.
[1] Wheelock, 4.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Pongracic, Jr.,
21.
[4] Friedman, 80.
[5] Pongracic, Jr.,
23.
[6] Friedman, 82.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., 83.
[9] Wheelock, 4.
[10] Higgins, 1-3
Bibliography:
Friedman,
Milton and Rose Friedman. Free to Choose: A Personal Statement. Orlando:
Harcourt, Inc., 1990.
Higgs,
Robert. “Crisis, Bigger Government, and Ideological Change: Two Hypotheses on
the Rachet Phenomenon.” Explorations in Economic History 22, no. 1 (1985):
1-28.
Pongracic,
Ivan, Jr. “The Great Depression According to Milton Friedman.” Freeman 57,
no.7 (2007): 21-27.
Wheelock,
David C. “Monetary Policy in the Great Depression: What the Fed Did, and Why.” Review-Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis 74, no. 2 (1992): 3-28.